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Abstract Recent global efforts of the United States and England to withdraw from
international institutions, along with recent challenges to human rights courts from
Poland and Hungary, have been described as part of a growing global populist
backlash against the liberal international order. Several scholars have even identified
the recent threat of mass withdrawal of African states from the International Criminal
Court (ICC) as part of this global populist backlash. Are the African challenges to the
ICC part of a global populist movement developing in Africa? More fundamentally,
how are the African challenges to the ICC examples of populism, if at all? In this
paper, I show that, while there is considerable overlap between the strategies used by
particular African leaders to challenge the ICC and those typically considered
populist, as well as a discernible thin populist ideology to sustain them, there is
insufficient evidence of a larger anti-ICC populist movement in Africa. Although
Africa is not as united against the ICC as the populist narrative suggests, the recent
challenges to the Court from Africa pose a significant challenge to the Court, as the
institution is still in the early stages of building its legitimacy.
1 Introduction
Recent global efforts of the United States and England to withdraw from interna-
tional institutions, along with recent challenges to human rights courts from Poland
and Hungary, have been described as part of a growing global populist backlash
against the liberal international order. Several scholars have even identified the
recent threat of mass withdrawal of African states from the International Criminal
Court (ICC) as part of this global populist backlash (Voeten 2019; Helfer 2018;
Posner 2017). Are the African challenges to the ICC part of a growing global
backlash against liberal internationalism? More fundamentally, how are the African
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challenges to the ICC examples of populism, if at all? My aim in this paper is to
answer the latter of these questions.
Populism has recently become a subject of renewed scholarly interest, and
considerable debate exists about the proper definition and application of the concept.
The term populism has been used to describe a movement, a kind of ideology, and a
kind of strategy or discourse used by political leaders. This section lays out some
current debates about populism, introduces a definition of populism that is main-
stream in the literature, and describes particular strategies used by populist leaders.
Ernesto Laclau’s (1977, 2012 reprint edition) influential account of populism
maintains that populism is more about form than substance. The broad ideology
upon which populism rests is that the will of the people should rule, which makes
democracy the typical home of populism. Beyond appealing to the people, Laclau
argues that populism is not associated with any more particular political ideology. In
his more recent work, Laclau (2005) identifies three preconditions for the rise of a
populist movement: first, ‘a vague feeling of generalized dissatisfaction,’ secondly, a
‘qualitative jump’ that crystallizes into a ‘discourse that divides society into two
camps: the people and those in power,’ and thirdly, the emergence of an ‘empty
signifier’ that represents the unsatisfied demands of the people as a totality. Gener-
ally speaking, Laclau argues that populism can be a particularly positive force in a
democracy, insofar as it livens the populace and can uproot an oppressive political
system.
Other, more contemporary scholars have been particularly critical of populism,
especially with regard to populism’s impact on democratic values and practices. Cas
Mudde (2015b) defines populism as ‘a thin-centered ideology that considers society
to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure
people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an
expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.’ This definition
figures prominently into contemporary work on populism, and enjoys support even
among those who regard populism as a strategy rather than a sort of ideology (Posner
2017; Friedman 2017; Resnick 2017; de la Torre 2015). Mudde (2015a) generally
agrees with Laclau that populism is not about substance, but about form. Unlike
Laclau, however, Mudde insists that populism is a particularly problematic form of
political expression in a democracy, insofar as it embraces a form of moral monism
that denies the existence of divisions in society, and rejects the legitimacy of
opposition. Similarly, Jan-Werner Müller (2016) argues that populists claim a
moral monopoly on defining who is part of ‘the people,’ which is exclusionary
and harmful to democracy.
Mudde (2015a) explains that populists reject compromise, insofar as compromise
is seen as corrupting the pure will of the people. Instead, populist leaders embrace a
single narrative of the will of the people, which populist leaders take as their moral
and political mandate. Mudde thus further argues that populism is anti-pluralist and,
thus, necessarily anti-liberal-democratic, insofar as pluralism is necessary for liberal
democracy (2015b, p. 433). This is true, for Mudde, of both right- and left-wing
variations of populism. William Galston (2018) shares the view that populism is
exclusionary, but he denies the existence of left-wing populism. For Mudde,
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left-wing variations of populism are typically less exclusionary than right-wing
variations, but both are exclusionary, because they reject opposing views as
illegitimate.
Some scholars have added that when populists challenge the ‘elites,’ they do so
either as outsiders on behalf of common people, or as insiders who claim a mandate
from them (Posner 2017, p. 2; Resnick 2017). Right-wing populists in the US and
Europe today identify a liberal, cosmopolitan elite as the corrupt enemy of the pure
people, who are identified in nationalistic terms. Left-wing populists, by contrast,
typically claim to represent the will of the economically oppressed people who are
united against a greedy, often domestic, elite who controls the system.
In addition to carving society into two separate and homogenous groups, with the
pure people on one side, and the corrupt elite on the other, some argue that populists
also challenge institutions that constrain their ability to translate the voice of the
people into legal and political realities. Robert Jansen (2015) explains that populists
typically try to bypass existing institutions, and Kenneth Roberts (2015) observes
that populism grows more readily where institutions are already weak or discredited,
or where people feel alienated by existing institutions. Furthermore, some populist
leaders rely on ‘political theology,’ by using religious images and essentialist
narratives of the people, to bypass institutions (de la Torre 2015; Arato 2015).
A further common theme is that populists typically use catchy slogans, and often
direct language to appeal to the masses (Posner 2017; Friedman 2017; Norris and
Inglehart 2019). In the US, we see this, for example, in Trump’s slogan to ‘Make
America Great Again,’ and in the promise of the Occupy Movement to free the
American poor and diminishing middle class from the economic oppression of the
‘One Percent.’ De la Torre (2015) and Resnick (2015) add that populists also
typically use symbolic or cultural performances to appeal to common people.
2 African Challenges to the ICC
Before we can evaluate in what sense, if any, the African challenges to the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC) are examples of populism, we need to consider what
those challenges are. I focus primarily on the anti-ICC efforts of three African heads
of state—former President al Bashir of Sudan, President Kenyatta of Kenya, and
former President Zuma of South Africa—with occasional reference to other African
political leaders.
It is worth noting that African states played a pivotal role in bringing the ICC into
being. The first country in the world to ratify the Rome Statute, which is the founding
and governing document of the Court, was Senegal, an African state, in 1999. The
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was the 60th state to ratify the Statute, in
2002, thereby allowing it to enter into force. In 2004, the ICC had its first case—a
self-referral from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)—to investigate
alleged Rome Statute crimes of Congolese rebel leaders in the context of an ongoing
armed conflict. Soon after, Uganda and the Central African Republic (CAR)
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followed with self-referrals of rebel leaders in their respective states. These self-
referrals provided a ‘soft landing’ for the ICC, insofar as the two other referral
mechanisms are considered more controversial (Kuwali 2018). The two other
referral mechanisms are: an independent referral by the ICC’s Office of the Prose-
cutor (OTP) (which was later carried out in Kenya, Cote d’Ivoire, Georgia, and
Burundi) and a referral by the United Nations (UN) Security Council (used to refer
cases in Sudan and Libya). As of November 2018, all but one of the ICC’s eleven
situations in its docket investigates individuals involved in conflicts in Africa, which
has raised concerns that the ICC is inappropriately targeting Africa.
Aside from the apparent ‘Afrocentrism’ of ICC investigations, three specific
actions undertaken by the Court’s first Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, dimin-
ished African support for the Court over the last decade. The first is when the OTP
issued an arrest warrant for Sudanese President al Bashir for alleged genocide in
Darfur in 2009 pursuant to a referral by the UN Security Council. This was
controversial for several reasons. Not only is Sudan not a member of the ICC, but
also this was the first ICC arrest warrant issued for a sitting president, as well as the
first ICC referral through the UN Security Council. This ushered in criticism from
certain African leaders, especially from al Bashir himself. In a 2009 interview, al
Bashir denounced the ICC as a ‘tool to terrorize countries that the West thinks are
disobedient’ (Dealey 2009).
Using the pulpit of the African Union (AU), an intergovernmental organization
consisting of all 54 African countries organized to promote unity and solidarity in
Africa, al Bashir claimed head of state immunity under customary international law.
With his own people, al Bashir used public spectacles to maintain support. Al Bashir
often danced on stage, while waving a stick and speaking in the common tongue of
his people, while he denounced his enemies as ‘insects’ (Fletcher 2012). The arrest
warrant for al Bashir strained relations between the ICC and the AU, so much so that
leaders of the AU petitioned the OTP to rescind the arrest warrant against al Bashir,
and when the ICC did not, the AU called for non-cooperation with the Court (Hobbs
2015, p. 7). Muammar Gaddafi, who was the acting Chairperson of the AU at the
time, as well as the President of Libya, criticized the ICC’s action, calling it ‘an
attempt by [the West] to re-colonise their former colonies’ (Vilmer 2016, p. 1321,
citing BBC 2009).
The second action that ushered in criticism from Africa is when former Prosecu-
tor Ocampo initiated an investigation in 2010 into Kenyan politicians, Uhuru
Kenyatta and William Ruto, for violence that erupted in Kenya after the Presidential
Election of December 27, 2007, which caused 1200 deaths and 300,000 displaced
persons (Hobbs 2015). Kenyatta at first demonstrated a willingness to cooperate with
the ICC’s investigation into the post-election violence for which he was allegedly
responsible, but he soon became uncooperative (Hobbs 2015). ICC arrest warrants
were issued for six Kenyan politicians, including Kenyatta and Ruto, who were
collectively labeled the ‘Ocampo Six.’ In response, Kenyatta and his supporters
sought to mobilize the Kenyan masses against the ICC. Moreover, he sought to do
this while campaigning for President in the next Kenyan Presidential Election.
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Specifically, Kenyatta and Ruto appealed to Kenyans who were previously
opposed on ethnic grounds, and united them against a common enemy: the ICC
(Maupeu 2013). They led prayer tours through Kenya, which Hervé Maupeu
describes as a sort of ‘pentacostalization of political life.’ Through pentacostal
rituals, Kenyatta and Ruto spread the narrative that God blessed them in their efforts
to bring peace to Kenya and denounced those guilty of causing the misfortunes of
Kenyans, namely, Westerners (Maupeu 2013).
In 2013, Kenyatta and Ruto were elected President and Deputy President, respec-
tively. At the 2013 Anniversary Summit of the AU, President Kenyatta used his new
position of authority to criticize the Court. Like al Bashir, he appealed to head of
state immunity under customary international law to argue the ICC had no jurisdic-
tion over him (even though Kenya, unlike Sudan, ratified the Rome Statute, and
Article 27 of the Statute declares official capacity irrelevant to whether an individual
can be prosecuted at the Court.) Kenyatta called for mass withdrawal of African
states from the ICC, asserting that ICC investigations are nothing but ‘race hunting’
in Africa (Vilmer 2016, p. 1322). A similar view was expressed by a former
Gambian Information Minister, who asserted that the acronym ‘ICC’ stands for the
‘International Caucasian Court,’ and who accused the Court with persecuting and
humiliating people of color (Hersher 2016). Ultimately, after key witnesses in the
Kenyatta case disappeared or were killed, the ICC dropped the charges against
Kenyatta for lack of sufficient evidence.
The third event that diminished African support for the ICC arose when the ICC
filed a formal complaint against South Africa for welcoming al Bashir into
South Africa for a Summit of the AU in 2015, rather than arresting him, pursuant
to the ICC arrest warrant issued against him in 2009. South African President Zuma
argued he had a duty, recognized by Article 98 of the Rome Statute, to provide
diplomatic immunity to senior foreign officials who visited South Africa, and if
challenged by the ICC, President Zuma threatened to withdraw from the Court.
When the ICC issued a complaint against South Africa, South Africa notified the UN
Security Council that it was withdrawing from the ICC in October 2016. While
President Zuma did not politically campaign against the ICC (like Kenyatta) or
accuse the ICC of inappropriately targeting Africa (like Kenyatta and al Bashir),
Zuma’s refusal to cooperate with the Court was a meaningful challenge to the
Court’s legitimacy. Not only was the Court already challenged by two other pow-
erful African heads of state, Kenyatta and al Bashir, but also South Africa was an
early advocate of the Court during the Rome Conference, as a member of the Like-
Minded Group, which was pivotal in drafting and passing the Rome Statute. Thus,
South Africa’s refusal to cooperate with the Court exposed the weakness of the new
institution, relative to established state power. In the same month as South Africa’s
public statement of withdrawal, two other African states—Burundi and The Gam-
bia—also notified the UN Security Council of their intention to withdraw from the
Court (Kuwali 2018). Some argued that Kenya was soon to follow.
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3 Are the African Challenges to the ICC an Example
of Populism?
The strategies of Presidents al Bashir, Kenyatta, and Zuma are examples of particular
kinds of political leaders, namely what Clarke (2009) calls, ‘Big Men Presidents,’
who anchor their political power in their personal rule. But are they also populists?
Interestingly, recent literature on contemporary African populism does not point to
the anti-ICC efforts described above as examples of African populism, though both
Presidents Kenyatta and Zuma are identified as populist leaders in this literature
(Cheeseman and Larmer 2015; Resnick 2015; Resnick 2017). Other scholars iden-
tify the African challenges to the ICC as part of the global populist backlash against
liberal internationalism, but do not support this claim with concrete examples from
Africa (Voeten 2019; Helfer 2018; Posner 2017). In a 2017 working paper, Helfer
and Showalter (2017) offer a systematic analysis of Kenya’s integrated backlash
strategy against the ICC, but they do not describe this backlash as a distinctly
populist one. In this section, I directly examine whether the anti-ICC strategies of
the African leaders described in the previous section fit the description of populism
laid out in Section 1.
There are clear similarities between the strategies typically used by populist
leaders and the strategies employed by the African leaders described above. For
instance, President al Bashir’s tactic of speaking in the common tongue of his people
when he denounces his enemies as ‘insects’ is a direct use of language that is meant
to appeal to the masses, which is common of the populist form (Posner 2017;
Friedman 2017). Further, when al Bashir dances on the stage and waves a stick
when he addresses his people, he is appealing to the kinds of cultural and symbolic
performances that de la Torre (2015) and Resnick (2015) link to populist leaders.
Arguably, Kenyatta’s pentacostal missions are examples of political theology used
by populists, as described by Arato (2015).
Roberts (2015) observed that populism grows more readily where institutions are
already weak or discredited, which might not seem to apply to Kenya or
South Africa, insofar as these states have some of the stronger democratic institu-
tions in Africa. However, Kagwanja (2009) notes that, around the 2007 Presidential
Election, Kenya was ripe for unrest due to problems of poverty, inequality, and
corruption, which gave rise to ethno-nationalist sentiment in Kenya. In post-
Apartheid South Africa, a feeling of alienation from democratic institutions contin-
ued to exist for many, which provides fertile soil for the growth of populism. What is
more, Jansen’s (2015) point that populists try to bypass existing institutions is
apparent in the strategies of Kenyatta and Zuma, both of whom tried to circumvent
legal process at the ICC.
Beyond these rather loosely connected populist strategies, do the African political
leaders who challenge the ICC appeal to something deeper, perhaps, that is, to a
shared ideology? To recall, Mudde’s influential definition of populism holds that
populism is ‘a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately sepa-
rated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the
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corrupt elite’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté
générale (general will) of the people.’ Assuming the African anti-ICC efforts are
sustained by a populist ideology, let us then answer three questions to make sense of
it: who are the pure people, who are the corrupt elite, and do the African leaders who
challenge the ICC represent the voice or will of people, who have until now
remained a silent majority?
Let us consider President Kenyatta’s efforts to unite Kenyans who were previ-
ously divided on ethnic grounds, and to pit them against the ICC. This appears to do
what Mudde’s definition says populism does, carve out two homogenous and
antagonist groups: the ICC and Kenyans. This would suggest that President Ken-
yatta is advancing a sort of right-wing populism, given the nationalistic construct of
the pure Kenyan people. Maupeu (2013) explains, however, that when Kenyatta
challenges the ICC, he treats the Court as a stand-in for something broader, namely
the West. That the ICC is a stand-in for the West is supported by claims made by
other Africa leaders, former President al Bashir and former President Gaddafi, who
accuse the ICC of being a neo-colonial tool used by the West to carry out regime
change through the guise of law. The West, however, is not part of the society of any
state, but is part of global society. Thus, if Kenyatta’s challenges to the ICC rely on,
and express, a populist antagonism, then it seem to be between the West that the ICC
embodies, as the corrupt global elite, and the silent majority of Kenyans as the pure
people.
When Kenyatta asserts that the ICC is waging a ‘race hunting’ campaign,
however, he appeals beyond Kenyans, to Africans as a people, and even to blacks
as a race. A former Gambian Information Minister does something similar when he
asserts that the acronym ‘ICC’ stands for the ‘International Caucasian Court,’ and
when he claims that the ICC operates by persecuting and humiliating people of color.
These accusations about the racial bias of the Court suggest that the two groups in
the populist antagonism are not Kenyans, or Gambians, or people of any particular
African state, and the ICC/West, but rather Africans and the ICC/West, or perhaps
more fundamentally, blacks and whites.
Clarke (2009, 2015) has written extensively on the idea that the ICC represents
whiteness and reproduces images of blackness as either warlord, or as victim in need
of saving by whites. She argues that the ICC operates problematically on the basis of
Western, liberal ideas of individual criminal responsibility, which ignore the long-
standing material causes of violence in Africa (2009, 6–8). Moreover, Clarke (2016)
argues that there is inherent racial bias built into the Rome Statute’s understanding of
international crime, insofar as the kind of violence that is typically carried out by
Western states through colonialism and domination is not recognized as criminal,
whereas the violence that is more typically carried out in African states is identified
as criminal. Mills (2008) has advanced similar arguments about the inherent racial
bias and injustice of liberal ideas and practices. This suggests a deep-rooted racial
antagonism might be behind the populist antagonism underlying the African chal-
lenges to the ICC.
If underlying the challenges to the ICC from Kenyatta and others is a challenge to
the West, and what it represents, from Africa as a whole, then we should expect to
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see African state support, and popular African support, for withdrawal. Beyond anti-
ICC populist strategies, and the thin ideology that appears to sustain them, is there
sufficient evidence of an anti-ICC populist movement in Africa? One might ask why
it matters whether there is an anti-ICC populist movement in Africa. To this, I
respond as follows. When a leader who truly embodies the will of a silent majority
comes into power, it is reasonable to expect this majority to use the political leverage
provided by the leader to translate their will into legal and political reality. If there is
a populist antagonism between the pure people of Africa and the Western, liberal
elite of the ICC, then we should expect to see this will instantiate into a real African
withdrawal movement when the opportunity for exit arises.
Vilmer (2016), however, questions the notion that the silent majority of Africans
is united against the ICC:
Heads of state should not be confused with their populations: the hostility to the ICC comes
not from ‘Africa’ but from certain African leaders, simply out of fear of being next on the
list. They play on anti-colonial populism, which is often strongly echoed in the African
press. The anti-ICC propaganda has been entirely created by a handful of heads of states
seeking to escape its reach. However, their discourse can be persuasive, and so it remains
unclear to what extent these perceptions are genuinely shared among African populations
(Vilmer 2016, p. 1337).
Vilmer suggests that African leaders who challenge the Court exploit the anti-
colonial concerns of African people in order to protect themselves from the Court’s
reach. In what follows, I offer evidence to support Vilmer’s suspicion, to question
the idea that Africa is united against the ICC, and to dispel the idea that there is a
general anti-ICC populist movement in Africa. A movement has a sort of temporality
to it, so I will address this issue by considering evidence before, during, and after the
challenges to the Court were advanced by Kenyatta and others.
Before tensions developed between the ICC and certain African leaders, let us
recall how the ICC acquired jurisdiction over several of its cases. The first three cases
to come to the ICC were through state self-referral in the DRC, Uganda, and CAR.
The two cases that came to the ICC via the Prosecutor’s propio motu powers of self-
initiation—Kenyan and Mali—were done so with the authority of the respective
governments. In Sudan and Libya—the two cases referred to the ICC via UN
Security Council vote—all three African states on the Council (which has a total
of 15 members) voted in favor of referring a fellow African state. Specifically, the
DRC, Benin, and Tanzania voted to refer Sudan, and South Africa, Gabon, and
Nigeria voted to refer Libya (Steinberg 2016).
During the onset of African challenges to the Court, the ICC still continued to
develop support with African states. Two overall responses from Africa are partic-
ularly noteworthy in challenging the idea that Africa is united against the Court: first,
the leadership roles that African states are taking to affirm or re-affirm their com-
mitment to the ICC despite the challenges from other states; and, secondly, the
efforts of African courts and other legal bodies to challenge the withdrawal threats
through rule of law.
To elaborate on each of these, consider, first, that while Presidents Kenyatta, al
Bashir, Zuma, and Gaddafi used their leadership positions in the AU to spread the
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narrative that Africa was united against the Court in calling for collective with-
drawal, new African states ratified the Rome Statute and members of the ICC
publicly reaffirmed their commitment to the Court. While the AU’s aim is to create
and represent African solidarity, it cannot impose collective withdrawal on African
states. Nor does the AU actually represent the position of each individual African
state with regard to the ICC. New African states that have signed and ratified the
Rome Statute even after the AU leadership opposed the Court include Seychelles in
2010, Tunisia and Cape Verde in 2011, and Cote d’Ivoire in 2013 (Vilmer 2016,
p. 1322).
In response to withdrawal threats from other African states, Zambian President
Edgar Lungu, polled his people to ask whether they wanted Zambia to withdrawal
from the ICC. An overwhelming 93.3% of Zambians who participated voted in favor
of Zambia remaining in the ICC (Mavhinga and Stagno Ugarte 2017). Moreover,
Botswana not only is a strong supporter of the Court, and challenges anti-ICC claims
made by the AU, but also even declares it would arrest Al-Bashir if given an
opportunity (Mills and Bloomfield 2017, p. 121). In July 2016, Botswana was joined
by Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia, Cote d’Ivoire, and Algeria in rejecting calls from the
AU’s leadership for mass withdrawal, such that the issue did not even make it onto
the agenda during the annual AU Summit (Mills and Bloomfield 2017).
Secondly, some of the greatest challenges to the withdrawal momentum came
from states whose leaders mounted the opposition to the Court, including, Kenya,
South Africa, and The Gambia. In Kenya, the post-election crimes were first brought
to the attention of the ICC when the Kenyan Waki Commission, which was
sponsored by the AU, shared with the ICC its dissatisfaction with how the Kenyan
Government was responding to the Commission’s judgment that a special tribunal
be set up to investigate crimes against humanity in connection with the violence.
Originally, Parliamentarians from both sides of the partisan divide—the Orange
Democratic Movement and the Party of National Unity—united under the slogan
‘Don’t be vague; let’s go to the Hague’ and sought international legal accountability
for the post-election violence (Clarke 2015, p. 599).
Once Kenyatta was elected President, he declared an intention to withdraw from
the ICC, but as of 2018, Kenyatta still has not brought the decision into effect by
notifying UN Secretary General, as required by Article 127 of Rome Statute.
According to a 2015 Afrobarometer survey, a majority of Kenyans reported their
support for ICC prosecutions of Kenyan political figures, the belief that the Court is
an important tool toward achieving accountability in the country, and a rejection of
withdraw from the Court (Lekalake and Buchanan-Clarke 2015). This arguably
would make withdrawal a bad political move for Kenyatta. In February 2018,
African newspapers reported that the outgoing Attorney General of Kenya, Githu
Muigai, who left office on good terms with Kenyatta, reaffirmed Kenya’s commit-
ment to the ICC, noting that Kenya has no intention of withdrawing from the Court,
and welcomes the ideals of the Rome Statute and partnerships that will allow Kenya
to address problems plaguing the state (Ndunda February 2018; Odongo February
2018).
African Challenges to the International Criminal Court: An Example of Populism? 263
Similarly, a withdrawal from the Court by South Africa has not been officially
pursued, despite threats of withdrawal from President Zuma (Gumede 2019). In what
some call a triumph of the rule of law, the Supreme Court of South Africa blocked
Zuma from using executive power to withdraw from the ICC, judging withdrawal to
be in violation of South Africa’s constitutional obligations (Vilmer 2016). Because
the South African Parliament voted to ratify the Rome Statute, the Court held that
Parliament must vote on withdrawal if South Africa wishes to leave the ICC.
Currently, in South Africa, the recent resignation of President Zuma, and his
prosecution in national courts for corruption charges, has enervated the discussion
of withdrawal of momentum. Moreover, Gambia threatened to withdraw from the
Court over the last decade, but the country has since elected a new president, and
officially reversed its position on the ICC, now stating the intent to remain with the
Court.
How do we make sense of the withdrawal threats in light of the reality that only
one African state has actually withdrawn from the Court? Bosco (2014) suggests that
the threat of withdrawal is actually an effort to control the ICC, rather than to
marginalize or undermine it. This is supported by recent empirical work by
Franziska Boehme (2018) which shows that most African leaders use anti-ICC
discourse as a tool of ‘voice’ to express internal dissatisfaction with the Court, rather
than to express a real intention to leave the institution. Particularly, African states
used voice to express criticism of the politicization of the ICC, of the UN Security
Council’s referral of al Bashir to the Court, and of the ICC’s past refusal to fulfill
deferral requests for Sudan and Kenya (Boehme 2018, p. 433). Despite this criticism,
Boehme concludes that most African states express the intention to remain with the
Court rather than to leave it. In fact, he found that African states have made more
public statements at the UN expressing loyalty to the Court in 2017 than in 2007.
This shows that, while African leaders who led the charge against the ICC used
populist strategies and ideology to present a picture of Africa united against the
Court, this is a deceptively false narrative that fails to capture continued African
support for the institution.
4 Conclusion
In October 2016, the mass exodus of African states from the ICC appeared to be on
the horizon as three states—South Africa, The Gambia, and Burundi—notified the
UN Security Council of their intent to withdraw from the ICC. As of October 2019,
however, the only African state to withdraw from the ICC is Burundi, where the
withdrawal process was initiated after the ICC began investigating crimes against
humanity that were allegedly carried out by state agents against the Burundi civilian
population. Examining the use of populist strategies and ideology by particular
African leaders to challenge the ICC allows us to acquire a deeper understanding
of some of the dangers with populist politics.
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True to Mudde’s paradigm of populism, the African leaders who use populist
strategies to challenge the ICC also call Africans who support the ICC ‘neo-colonial
puppets’ (Achaleke Taku 2016). By derogatorily labeling African states that support
the ICC neo-colonial puppets, these leaders thereby reject opposing views as
illegitimate. For them, there is no compromise or plurality of positions to be
considered regarding the ICC. This problematically frustrates the possibility for
real deliberation on the serious issues at stake in the anti-ICC African narrative to
take place. To strengthen the democratic foundations of relatively new democracies
in Africa, African political leaders should provide their peoples with the space to
deliberate on the justice sought by the ICC that addresses the neocolonial concerns
of Africans, rather than simply exploiting those concerns.
A further concern is that, in rejecting opposition as illegitimate, populist leaders
claim to represent the will of the people as a whole, and rely on totalizing narratives
to do this, which can snowball into more public support for platforms than previ-
ously existed. Rather than voicing the will of an existing majority, populist leaders
may be able to construct a new majority, if those who oppose them are not given a
genuine opportunity to speak out against their political views. This is particularly
dangerous when leaders claim to represent the will of the people and work to
undermine institutions that were designed to protect people from oppressive
governments.
Moreover, insofar as it is typical for populist leaders to resort to threats, it exposes
another concern with populist politics. The record shows that anti-ICC African
leaders used threats to withdrawal from the ICC to voice criticism from within the
Court, rather than to express the concrete intention to leave it. The use of threat as a
political strategy is problematic because it does not encourage compromise or
consensus, but instead operates on deceptively simple false narratives and presents
single-sided solutions that fail to capture the nuance of complex political issues.
Ultimately, the populist strategies and ideology used by particular African leaders
to challenge the ICC do not represent the full story. Africa has a far more complex
relationship with the Court than the populist narrative suggests, and democratic
deliberation on the nature of this relationship is needed to remedy the deceptively
simple false narrative that Africa is united in opposition against the Court. None-
theless, while Africa is not united against the Court, the anti-ICC populist narrative
constructed by particular African political leaders has weakened the sociological
legitimacy of the institution, and because the ICC’s normative legitimacy depends,
in part, on its sociological legitimacy, these challenges have challenged the Court’s
normative legitimacy as well. For the Court to demonstrate its normative legitimacy,
it must take seriously the accusations advanced against it by particular African
leaders. This creates a need for the ICC to shape its institutional character and
identity in Africa, and will hopefully provide African peoples the opportunities to
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voice their concerns in a way that promotes human rights and accountability on the
continent.1
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